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Closing the Entrepreneurial Gap: Liberalizing 
Employment Law to Restore French 
Competitiveness 
 
By Kelly Hamren* 
 
Abstract: Malaise in the European economy, and particularly in France, is both a 
result of dampened entrepreneurial activity and a continuing drag on economic 
competitiveness.  In France, rather than undertaking much needed structural reform, 
the government has relied heavily on tax increases and heightened public spending to 
stimulate growth.  This Note contends that French reforms should instead focus on 
liberalizing French employment law to encourage entrepreneurial activity.  Because 
entrepreneurship requires innovation and creates new economic opportunities, it is 
increasingly viewed as one of the most important means of resuscitating depressed 
economies.  By its very nature, entrepreneurship capitalizes on the formation of new 
ideas and the development of innovative products and services.  Statistically, France 
has lower levels of entrepreneurial activity than the United States, China, Brazil, and 
many other European countries.  France’s government institutions and legal 
framework play a critical role in contributing to its low levels of start-up activity.  
Rigid hiring and firing laws favor employees and do not lend themselves to the type of 
quickly changing and shifting workforces needed by start-up businesses.  The costs 
and legal implications of hiring, firing, and expanding create risks that often seem to 
outweigh the rewards for French entrepreneurs.  This Note provides an in-depth 
overview of the specific policies and practices in French employment law that restrict 
growth in France’s entrepreneurial sector.  It concludes with a prescriptive analysis 
for restructuring the French legal system to help encourage entrepreneurship and 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
When France’s industry minister wrote to an American CEO 
proposing the possible sale of a failing French tire plant, the CEO responded, 
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“How stupid do you think we are?”1  In a controversial letter, Maurice 
Taylor, the CEO of Titan International, expressed derision regarding the 
French “so-called” work ethic, writing that “[t]he French workforce gets 
paid high wages but works only three hours.  They get one hour for breaks 
and lunch, talk for three and work for three.”2  Stirring indignation 
throughout France, The Economist suggests that the severity of the French 
reaction exposed a nerve, because “[f]or every measure of hyperbole and 
gratuitous insult in Mr. Taylor’s letter there was also a grain of truth.”3  
The grain of truth to this statement is reflected in France’s declining 
competitiveness, record high unemployment, and an economy teetering on 
the brink of recession.4 
This Note explains the French economy’s struggle to remain 
competitive by examining the ways in which France’s rigid employment 
laws deter entrepreneurial activity, one of the key drivers of economic 
growth.  Restrictive employment laws are a key contributor to the French 
economy’s declining competitiveness because they inhibit entrepreneurial 
activity in three important ways.  First, rigid hiring and firing procedures 
increase the costs of entrepreneurial risk and decrease firm productivity.  
Second, complex regulatory requirements triggered by increases in 
workforce personnel inhibit firm growth and encourage inefficient 
allocations of labor.  Third, large social security contributions impose 
prohibitive start-up costs for entrepreneurs. 
In order to illustrate the harmful impact of rigid employment laws on 
France’s economic performance and levels of entrepreneurship, Part II of this 
Note begins by addressing the declining competitiveness of the French 
economy and providing an overview of France’s entrepreneurial gap.  Next, 
Part III discusses entrepreneurship more generally, placing particular 
emphasis on the role of legal institutions in shaping entrepreneurial activity.  
Then, expanding on these theoretical principles, Part IV examines specific 
employment laws that stifle French entrepreneurship, thereby stunting 
economic growth.  Finally, Part V concludes with a prescriptive analysis, 
suggesting that French employment laws need to be reformed in order to 
close France’s entrepreneurial gap and boost national competitiveness before 
the country’s economy continues to deteriorate. 
 
 
1 Emmanuel Jarry & Catherine Bremer, Titan CEO Scoffs at France’s Work Ethic and Its ‘So-Called 
Workers,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 20, 2013, 1:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/20/titan-ceo-
french-workers_n_2723996.html. 
2 Id. 
3 Arnaud Montebourg vs. “The Grizz,” ECONOMIST (Feb. 21, 2013, 3:16 PM), http://www.economist.com/ 
blogs/charlemagne/2013/02/french-business. 
4 Id. 
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II.  FRANCE’S DECLINING COMPETITIVENESS 
 
France is lagging behind its European neighbors at enacting 
substantive reform and is struggling to remain competitive.  The following 
part provides an overview of France’s economic challenges within the 
context of the euro crisis and highlights one of the main sources of the 
country’s economic malaise—low levels of entrepreneurship.  As France 
trails behind other European economies in competitiveness, it also suffers 
from an interrelated lack of entrepreneurial activity. 
 
A.  Europe’s Financial Crisis and the French Economy 
 
According to a recent report published by the World Economic Forum 
(WEF), “[s]ince the beginning of the financial and economic crisis in 2008, 
Europe has been in the eye of a storm, facing an intense financial crisis, 
decline in economic performance and growing public discontent.”5  In the 
wake of the financial crisis of 2008, economic activity in Europe suffered a 
sharp decline,6 European governments had to bail out banks, Iceland went 
bankrupt,7 and a sovereign debt crisis in the “Eurozone”8 triggered 
widespread concern over the potential breakup of the euro.9 
The Eurozone debt crisis erupted in late 2009 in reaction to Greece’s 
disclosure that the country had previously misreported national deficit 
levels.10  The disclosure severely damaged investor confidence, causing 
Greek bond spreads to rise to unsustainable levels while also galvanizing 
 
5 BEÑAT BILBAO-OSORIO ET AL., WORLD ECON. FORUM, REBUILDING EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS 
REPORT 27 (2013) [hereinafter EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS], available at http://www3.weforum.org/ 
docs/WEF_RebuildingEuropesCompetitiveness_Report_2013.pdf. 
6 According to a report prepared by the European Commission, “[i]n mid-2013 GDP in the EU and 
the euro area [was] respectively 2.4% and 3.1% below the pre-crisis levels of early 2008.”  EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECON. & FIN. AFF., EUROPEAN ECONOMIC FORECAST: 
AUTUMN 2013 10 (2013) [hereinafter FORECAST: AUTUMN 2013], available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee7_en.pdf. 
7 Sheyna Steiner, Timeline: Evolution of the European Debt Crisis, YAHOO! FINANCE (Oct. 29, 2012, 
3:01 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/timeline-evolution-european-debt-crisis-070133430.html. 
8 The term “Eurozone” will be used to refer to the 17 EU member states that use the euro as their 
currency, covering: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and Slovenia.  REBECCA M. 
NELSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EUROZONE CRISIS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS 1 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42377.pdf. 
9 Uncertainty regarding the integrity of the euro peaked at the end of 2011 and the first half of 
2012.  FORECAST: AUTUMN 2013, supra note 6, at 12–13.  See also Stefan Kaiser, Euro Crisis 
Reprieve: End to Bailout Programs Signals Recovery, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Nov. 15, 2013, 11:27 AM), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/end-of-bailout-programs-in-spain-and-ireland-signals-euro-
crisis-recovery-a-933650.html (“The summer of 2012 was horrific for Europe.  The euro zone seemed 
on the verge of collapse, investors were reluctant to lend money to debt-burdened countries and interest 
on Spanish and Italian bonds breached the psychologically critical 7-percent mark.”). 
10 NELSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 2. 
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international concern regarding the debt levels of other Eurozone 
countries.11  In the end, five Eurozone governments—including Greece, 
followed by Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus—had to borrow money 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other Eurozone 
governments through the European Central Bank (ECB) to avoid defaulting 
on their sovereign debt.12  Today, however, effective crisis management 
and economic reforms undertaken by a number of euro-area countries have 
helped restore international confidence in the euro and “uncertainty has 
receded but remains elevated.”13  As a result of extensive structural 
adjustments,14 the countries that suffered the most during the Eurozone 
crisis have reduced labor costs,15 increased labor market flexibility,16 
boosted their export ratios,17 and made significant progress at correcting 
fiscal imbalances by reigning in their deficits.18 
Whereas other Eurozone countries have already engaged in extensive 
structural reforms to boost economic performance,19 France has struggled 
to keep pace.20  Galvanizing considerable international publicity and 
provoking the ire of French officials,21 a controversial issue of The 
Economist recently ran an attention-grabbing cover that depicted France as 
a ticking time bomb with an image of seven French baguettes bound by the 
tricolor flag and a lit fuse at the bundle’s center.22  As the Eurozone’s 
 
11 Id. 
12 Steiner, supra note 7. 
13 FORECAST: AUTUMN 2013, supra note 6, at 12–13. 
14 Among these structural adjustments, in order to promote growth, many Eurozone countries have 
engaged in labor market reform, cut pension and welfare entitlements, streamlined administrative 
procedures, and deregulated product markets.  HOLGER SCHMIEDING & CHRISTIAN SCHULZ, LISBON 
COUNCIL, THE 2013 EURO PLUS MONITOR: FROM PAIN TO GAIN 28 (2013), available at 
http://www.lisboncouncil.net/publication/publication/101-the-2013-euro-plus-monitor-from-pain-to-
gain-.html. 
15 Id. at 12. 
16 Id. at 50. 
17 Id. at 19. 
18 Id. at 21. 
19 For example, Southern European countries—such as Portugal, Spain, and Italy—are undertaking 
labor market reforms that include (1) aligning collective wage-bargaining with business needs, (2) 
introducing more flexible work-time arrangements, and (3) relaxing restrictions on hiring and firing.  
EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 12. 
20 SCHMIEDING & SCHULZ, supra note 14, at 10 (observing that, as of late 2013, “France remains 
the only major European economy which is beset by serious health problems and has not yet done much 
about it”); see also William Horobin & Gabriele Parussini, S&P Cuts France’s Credit Rating by One 
Notch to Double-A, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2013, 1:28 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000 
1424052702303309504579184984164551794 (quoting the observation of Frederik Ducrozet, a senior 
economist at Crédit Agricole, that “when you look at price competitiveness, there is absolutely no doubt 
that France is lagging the structural adjustment that Germany has gone through over the past decade”). 
21 Angelique Chrisafis, France Blows up at Economist’s ‘Ticking Time-Bomb’ Cover, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 16, 2012, 11:55 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/16/economist-front-cover-france. 
22 The Time-Bomb at the Heart of Europe: Why France Could Become the Biggest Danger to 
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second-largest economy, France’s failure to undertake meaningful reform 
could pose a significant threat to European recovery, which has led the 
Lisbon Council, an economic think tank, to describe France as “[t]he sick 
man of Europe.”23  French underperformance along a variety of economic 
measures highlights the need for economic reform.  At its highest level of 
joblessness in over fifteen years,24 11% of the French population is 
currently unemployed.25  France is also “suffering from a widening 
prosperity gap” in terms of per capita GDP.26  In 2010, France placed 
eleventh out of a total of fifteen European economies, “ranking higher than 
only the Southern European Economies of Spain, Italy, Greece, and 
Portugal.”27  The government was forced to raise its estimated 2013 budget 
deficit from 3.7% to 4.1% of France’s GDP,28 and real GDP growth was 
projected at a mere 0.1% for 2013.29  Analysts also anticipated that fixed 
capital investment would contract by 2.5% in 2013.30 
 
B.  France’s Competitiveness Challenge 
 
Both in Europe and in France, lagging economic competitiveness is at 
the heart of the current financial crisis.  In its annual Global 
Competitiveness Report, the WEF defines competitiveness as “the set of 
institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of 
a country.”31  By driving the rates of return that can be obtained for 
investments in a particular country’s economy, productivity serves as a 
 
Europe’s Single Currency, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2012, at 13 [hereinafter Time-Bomb]. 
23 Hugh Carnegy, PMI Indicators Raise Worries over French Economy, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2014, 
2:51 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ad21a5c0-739f-11e3-a0c0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qicqqk8q.  
According to the Lisbon Council, in contrast to significant reform efforts by the four euro members—
Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal—whose economies fueled the euro’s crisis, “[w]e still find only 
very limited progress in France.”  SCHMIEDING & SCHULZ, supra note 14, at 3.  The European think 
tank continued: “The country needs to slash expenditures, cut taxes and go far beyond the minor labour 
market reform of early 2013. Otherwise, France could wind up at the very bottom of the European 
ranking in as little as three years.”  Id. 
24 Mark Deen, French Workers Who Talk for 3 Hours Don’t Cut It, Titan Says, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 
20, 2013, 1:19 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/french-workers-who-talk-for-3-
hours-don-t-cut-it-titan-says.html. 
25 EUROPEAN COMM’N, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECON. & FIN. AFFAIRS, EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC FORECAST: WINTER 2013 1 (2013) [hereinafter FORECAST: WINTER 2013], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee1_en.pdf. 
26 ERIC LABAYE ET AL., FRENCH EMPLOYMENT 2020: FIVE PRIORITIES FOR ACTION 14 (2012), 
available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/employment_and_growth/french_employment_2020. 
27 Id. 
28 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: FRANCE 4 (Jan. 2014). 
29 Id. at 6. 
30 Id. 
31 WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013: FULL DATA 
EDITION 4 (2012) [hereinafter GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013], available at 
http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2012-2013. 
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central component of competitiveness and economic growth that “sets the 
level of prosperity that can be earned by an economy.”32  The WEF has 
based its competitiveness analysis on the Global Competitiveness Index 
(GCI) since 2005, which serves as a comprehensive tool for measuring the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic foundations of national productivity 
along a variety of categories.33  The GCI is calculated by using the 
weighted average of twelve different “pillars of competitiveness,” which 
include, among other components of competitiveness, labor market 
efficiency and innovation.34  Although all twelve pillars are aggregated into 
a single competitiveness index, measures for each of the pillars are also 
reported individually to provide “a sense of the specific areas in which a 
particular country needs to improve.”35 
While France has long been considered one of the Eurozone’s 
economic leaders along with Germany,36 the country’s declining 
competitiveness has become increasingly pronounced.  Not only is France 
struggling to compete with the United States and other emerging 
economies outside of Europe, the French economy is facing increasing 
pressure to remain competitive alongside its European neighbors.  France 
ranked 21st in the WEF’s competitiveness rankings for 2012–2013, falling 
far behind Germany, which ranked 6th, as well as several other European 
economies.37  Although Europe’s economic position has gradually 
improved since 2012, France’s rank was downgraded two spots to 23rd in 
the competitiveness rankings for 2013–2014.38  On the one hand, the WEF 
notes that many features of the French economy help to enhance the 
 
32 Id. (“Although the productivity of a country determines its ability to sustain a high level of 
income, it is also one of the central determinants of its returns to investment, which is one of the key 
factors explaining an economy’s growth potential.”) (emphasis added). 
33 Id. 
34 The complete twelve pillars of competitiveness are as follows: (1) institutions; (2) infrastructure; 
(3) macroeconomic environment; (4) health and primary education; (5) higher education and training; 
(6) goods market efficiency; (7) labor market efficiency; (8) financial market development; (9) 
technological readiness; (10) market size; (11) business sophistication; and (12) innovation.  Id. at 8. 
35 Id. 
36 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 9 (“The governments of the Eurozone’s two largest 
economies—Germany and France—have been at the forefront of the EU’s crisis response.”); SCHMIEDING 
& SCHULZ, supra note 14, at 80 (“The French-German alliance is at the core of European integration 
and the euro.”). 
37 According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013, the following European economies 
were all ranked ahead of France: Switzerland, which was considered the most competitive country, 
ranked 1st, Finland was 3rd, Sweden was 4th, the Netherlands was 5th, Germany was 6th, the U.K. was 
8th, Denmark was 12th, Norway was 15th, Austria was 16th, and Belgium was 17th.  The United States 
was ranked as the 7th most competitive economy.  GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013, 
supra note 31, at 13. 
38 WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013–2014: FULL DATA 
EDITION 28 (2013) [hereinafter GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013–2014], available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global CompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf. 
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country’s growth potential: France has some of the best infrastructure in the 
world (ranked 4th), high levels of education and training (ranked 24th), a 
sophisticated and professional business culture (ranked 21st), an impressive 
capacity for innovation (ranked 19th), and a large market (ranked 8th).39  
On the other hand, the WEF also notes that the rigidity of the French labor 
market, which is ranked 116th due to strict hiring and firing rules and 
“conflict-ridden labor–employer relations,” poses a significant obstacle to 
French competitiveness.40 
Rather than addressing the root of the problem through substantive 
reform, the French government primarily responded to declining 
competitiveness by increasing spending and raising taxes for most of 2012 
and early 2013.41  As of November 2012, the French state consumed 57% 
of the GDP, and its public debt had risen to over 90% of the GDP.42  
French workers also pay the highest aggregate tax rate in the EU at 46% of 
France’s GDP.43  France enacted recent labor reform to improve employer 
flexibility while also enhancing employee security on June 14, 2013, but 
many have argued that the measures fall short of the type of employment 
reform the country needs to revitalize the economy.44  According to ING 
economist Julien Manceaux, although some of the reforms may help 
stimulate growth in 2014 and 2015, they are “too late [as] Italy and Spain 
have been adjusting their economies since 2011.”45 
As a result of France’s failure to engage in more far-reaching reforms, 
the country’s credit rating has suffered a number of significant blows since 
2012.  Two of the world’s leading credit rating agencies—Moody’s 
Investors Service and Standard and Poor’s—both downgraded France’s 




41 For example, the Socialist government of French President Francois Hollande passed a tax 
increase of almost $40 billion in 2012.  Horobin & Parussini, supra note 20. 
42 Time-Bomb, supra note 22. 
43 Phillip Inman, France Told to Reform Labour Market After Second Credit Rating Downgrade, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/08/france-labour-market-
reform-credit-rating-downgrade-sandp. 
44 See, e.g., Radu Vranceanu, Who Cares About the Unemployed?, ESSEC BUS. SCH. (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://knowledge.essec.edu/en/economy-finance/reforming-the-french-labor-market-who-cares-about-.html; 
Mark John & Nicholas Vinocur, France Passes Reform to Ease Hire-and-Fire Rules, REUTERS (May 
14, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/14/us-france-reform-idUSBRE94D0OF20130514. 
45 Horobin & Parussini, supra note 20. 
46 In January of 2012, Standard & Poor’s was the first to lower France’s previously AAA credit 
rating to AA+.  It attributed the downgrade to “France’s relatively high general government debt, as 
well as its labor market rigidities.”  France’s Unsolicited Long-Term Ratings Lowered to ‘AA+’; 
Outlook Negative, STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVS. (Jan. 13, 2012) [hereinafter France’s Long-
Term Ratings], http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID= 
1245327295020.  On November 19, 2012, Moody’s Investors Service followed suit, announcing its 
own downgrade.  According to Moody’s explanatory report, the primary consideration motivating 
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move, on November 8, 2013, Standard and Poor’s downgraded France’s 
sovereign debt a second time, bringing the rating down one notch from 
AA+ to AA.47  The rating agency criticized a number of recent tax reforms 
as inadequate to “raise France’s medium-term growth prospects,” and also 
cited France’s inability to raise employment through sufficient labor and 
employment reforms as one of the primary reasons for the downgrade.48 
As with previous credit rating downgrades, the market reacted to 
Standard and Poor’s second downgrade with what has been described as a 
“Gallic shrug.”49  On the day of the announcement, the CAC-40 stock 
index decreased by 0.8%50 and the yield spread of French over German 
debt returned to normal by the close of the European trading day, with 
“French bonds yielding 46 basis points more than the German 
benchmark.”51  Although the downgrade’s impact on the French debt 
market has been minimal, the lowered rating underscores France’s struggle 
to improve growth prospects alongside its European peers.52 
 
C.  Entrepreneurship and French Regulatory Restrictions 
 
One of the primary factors driving France’s declining competitiveness 
and failure to create growth is the country’s lack of entrepreneurial activity.  
Compared with the United States and other emerging markets, a much 
smaller percentage of the French population engages in entrepreneurial 
ventures.  According to data collected by the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (the GEM), in 2010, only 5.8% of France’s adult population 
engaged in “early-stage entrepreneurial activity.”53  In contrast, 7.6% of the 
population in the United States, 14.4% in China, and 17.5% in Brazil were 
 
France’s downgrade was the “risk to economic growth, and therefore to the government’s finances, 
posed by the country’s persistent structural economic challenges.”  Moody’s Downgrades France’s 
Government Bond Rating to Aa1 from Aaa, Maintains Negative Outlook, MOODY’S INVS. SERV. (Nov. 
19, 2012) [hereinafter Moody’s Downgrades], https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-
Frances-government-bond-rating-to-Aa1-from-Aaa--PR_260071.  Among these structural challenges, 
Moody’s highlighted “rigidities in labour and services markets, and low levels of innovation” as factors 
that “continue to drive France’s gradual but sustained loss of competitiveness.”  Id. 
47 Inman, supra note 43. 
48 Id. 
49 Katie Martin, Le Downgrade: Le Shrug, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
moneybeat/2013/11/08/le-downgrade-le-shrug/. 
50 Id. 
51 Nicholas Vinocur, S&P Lowers France Rating on Reform Doubts, Market Unfazed, REUTERS 
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/08/uk-france-rating-idUKBRE9A706F20131108. 
52 Martin, supra note 49. 
53 DONNA J. KELLEY, NIELS BOSMA & JOSE ERNESTO AMOROS, THE GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
MONITOR 2010 GLOBAL REPORT 23 (2010), available at http://entreprenorskapsforum.se/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/GEM-2010-Global-Report.pdf (“Total Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity 
(TEA) includes individuals in the process of starting a business, and those running new businesses less 
than 3 ½ years old.”). 
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characterized as early-stage entrepreneurs.54  Additionally, according to 
commentators, France is “strikingly short” of small- to mid-sized 
companies—another sign of low rates of entrepreneurship.55  In Germany, 
mid-sized companies referred to as Mittelstand firms form the backbone of 
the economy.56  In France, however, there are just over 4,000 medium-
sized enterprises, which proportionately amounts to half as many as 
Germany and Britain.57  Furthermore, whereas the average German 
company has 41 employees, the average French company is much smaller 
with just around 14 employees.58 
France’s low levels of entrepreneurship can be explained, at least in 
part, by the presence of onerous administrative regulations that increase the 
costs and complexity of running a business.59  In the WEF’s Global 
Competitiveness Report for 2012–2013, France ranked 126th under a 
category representing the “burden of government regulation.”60  The 
ranking indicates that compliance with government regulatory requirements 
is less burdensome in 125 other countries out of a total of 144 countries 
surveyed.61  This wide variety of regulatory requirements in France fosters 
an unfriendly business environment for entrepreneurial investment.62  In 
2012, France ranked 32nd out of a total of 185 economies in the World 
Bank’s annual “Ease of Doing Business” scorecard.63  France also placed 
23rd under a subcategory representing the “Ease of Starting a Business.”64  
Furthermore, France’s position in the rankings has continued to deteriorate 
since 2012.  In 2013, France dropped two spots on the “Ease of Doing 
Business” scorecard to 34th place65 and was additionally downgraded four 
 
54 Id. 
55 Special Report on France: So Much to Do, So Little Time, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2012, at 8 




59 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013, supra note 31, at 396.  Additionally, when 
presented with 16 different factors impacting business, 20.6% of the respondents in the WEF’s 
Executive Survey ranked “restrictive labor regulations” as the most problematic obstacle to conducting 
business in France.  Id. at 168. 
60 Id. at 169. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.  According to The Economist, pervasive regulatory restrictions present an easy explanation 
for the dearth of successful French entrepreneurs: “Everything from the labour market to pharmacies to 
taxis is heavily regulated: no wonder would-be entrepreneurs feel discouraged.  No entirely new 
company has entered the CAC-40 stockmarket index since it started in 1987; redundancies can lead to 
endless court proceedings; and trade unions and protesters tend to take to the streets at the first hint of 
reform.  It adds up to a deeply anti-business culture.”  Special Report, supra note 55. 
63 World Bank, Ease of Doing Business in France, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
data/exploreeconomies/france/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2013). 
64 Id. 
65 At 34th place, France received a worse “doing business score” than the following European 
economies: the United Kingdom at 7th place, Germany at 20th, Switzerland at 28th, and Belgium at 
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spots to 27th place for “Ease of Starting a Business.”66 
Out of a variety of regulatory practices burdening new businesses, this 
Note focuses on France’s restrictive employment laws, which play an 
integral role in limiting entrepreneurial growth.67  For instance, when 
presented with sixteen different factors impacting business, 20.6% of the 
respondents in the WEF’s executive survey on global competitiveness 
ranked “restrictive labor regulations” as the most problematic obstacle to 
conducting business in France.68  In order to better illustrate how 
employment laws impact entrepreneurs, the following section examines the 
concept of entrepreneurship in greater detail, exploring the relationship 
between the law and entrepreneurial activity in particular. 
 
III.  ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS A SOURCE OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
 
By helping bring new ideas and more efficient business models to the 
market, entrepreneurship is a tremendous source of growth that can either 
be fostered or deterred by a nation’s law-making institutions.  After first 
defining entrepreneurship and examining the ways in which it contributes 
to economic growth, this part pays particular attention to the role of the law 
in driving entrepreneurial activity.  While regulations imposed by 
employment protection laws discourage entrepreneurs, deregulation 
measures may have the potential to stimulate entrepreneurial activity. 
 
A.  Defining Entrepreneurship 
 
Although there are a variety of ways of defining what it means to be 
an entrepreneur, entrepreneurship has two essential features: (1) the 
identification and creation of new economic opportunities, and (2) the 
introduction of an idea into the market in the face of uncertainty.69 
 
33th.  WORLD BANK & INT’L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS 2013: SMARTER REGULATIONS FOR SMALL 
AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 3 (10th ed. 2013) [hereinafter ECONOMY PROFILE: FRANCE], 
available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing% 20Business/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB13-full-report.pdf. 
66 Id. at 164. 
67 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013, supra note 31, at 169. 
68 Id. 
69 Sander Wennekers & A. Roy Thurik, Linking Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth, 13 
SMALL BUS. ECON. 27, 31 (1999); see also Magnus Henrekson, Entrepreneurship and Institutions, 28 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 717, 720 (2007) (“[A] person can be said to engage in an entrepreneurial 
venture if she either on her own or in teams, and either inside or outside existing organizations: (1) 
perceives and creates new economic opportunities (new products, new production methods, new 
organizational schemes and new product market combinations); and, (2) introduces her or his idea in 
the market, in the face of uncertainty and other obstacles by making decisions on location, form, and the 
use of resources and institutions.”). 
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First, most scholarly literature on the subject of entrepreneurship 
focuses on the ability of entrepreneurs to innovate and generate new 
economic opportunities.  Joseph A. Schumpeter articulated the most widely 
recognized description of the entrepreneur to date as an individual who 
“disrupt[s] existing market balances by introducing new products, new 
methods of production, devising new business models, or opening new 
markets.”70  According to Schumpeter, by innovating and carrying out 
“new combinations” in the marketplace, the entrepreneur functions as an 
agent of “Creative Destruction”—a key contributor to economic vitality 
and development.71  In an overview of recent scholarship on 
entrepreneurship, Magnus Henrekson, President of the Research Institute of 
Industrial Economics in Stockholm, concludes that entrepreneurship is 
“about individuals and organizations—be they new, old, large, or small—
that actively contribute to renewal and change in the economy.”72  An 
economist defining entrepreneurship in more practical terms writes the 
following: “[A]n entrepreneur is . . . someone who responds affirmatively 
to the question ‘I am among those who initially established the 
business.’”73  Across a wide body of scholarship, this consistent emphasis 
on the entrepreneur’s ability to create new economic opportunities has led 
law professors Gordon Smith and Darian Ibrahim to observe that “the most 
influential definitions of entrepreneurship revolve around the concept of 
opportunities.”74 
Second, the ability to assume risk and brave uncertainty is another key 
feature of entrepreneurship.  In order to introduce new ideas into the 
marketplace or be among the first to establish a business, entrepreneurs 
need “the daring to embrace risks in the face of” uncertain economic 
outcomes.75  Laying the foundation for the observations advanced by 
Schumpeter, Frank Knight examined the relationship between 
entrepreneurs and uncertainty in his 1921 book “Risk, Uncertainty, and 
Profit.”76  Under the analytical framework developed by Knight, 
 
70 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, The Law as Stimulus: The Role of Law in Fostering Innovative 
Entrepreneurship, 6 ISJLP 153, 155 (2010); see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY (5th ed. 1976). 
71 D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1533, 1541–42 (2013); Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can Do 
About It, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 817, 822 (2007) (“The entrepreneur in the Schumpeterian 
scheme provides the driving force in the mechanism of change.”). 
72 Henrekson, supra note 69, at 719. 
73 Edward P. Lazear, Entrepreneurship, 23 J. LAB. ECON. 649, 650–51 (2005). 
74 Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 71, at 1540; see also Jeremy C. Short et al., The Concept of 
“Opportunity” in Entrepreneurship Research: Past Accomplishments and Future Challenges, 36 J. 
MGMT. 40, 41 (2010). 
75 Henrekson, supra note 69, at 719–20. 
76 Licht, supra note 71, at 823; see also Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, LIBRARY OF 
ECON. & LIBERTY, available at http://www.econlib.org/LIBRARY/Knight/knRUP1.html. 
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“[e]ntrepreneurs’ unique role in the economy (and in society more broadly) 
consists of their willingness to bear uncertainties.”77  According to law 
professor Amir Licht, the Schumpeterian theory of entrepreneurship 
involves a central premise that entrepreneurs are specially equipped to deal 
with uncertainty.78  Consequently, Licht himself writes that “the 
entrepreneur’s main function is to overcome the difficulties engendered by 
uncertainty.”79  Ultimately, the entrepreneur’s ability to capitalize on new 
economic opportunities requires the willingness to shoulder economic 
uncertainty. 
 
B.  The Role of Entrepreneurship in Generating Growth 
 
The two central features at play in the definition of entrepreneurship 
also link entrepreneurs to economic growth.  In order to thrive and remain 
competitive, countries need businesses with the ability to innovate and 
identify new opportunities for developing products and services.80  They 
also require businesses that can capitalize on cutting-edge knowledge by 
establishing new and efficient models to bring their ideas to the market in 
spite of economic uncertainty.81  By driving innovation and change in the 
national market, entrepreneurs are a key source of growth and 
entrepreneurship has attracted increasing attention as a means of 
resuscitating depressed economies.82  According to one mainstream 
economist, “[T]he entrepreneur is the single most important player in a 
modern economy.”83  Various studies and empirical data lend support to 
this claim, illustrating a strong correlation between high levels of 
entrepreneurship and economic growth.  Entrepreneurship also presents an 
especially important source of growth and competitiveness for advanced 
economies like France. 
Entrepreneurship helps stimulate economic growth because larger and 
 
77 Licht, supra note 71, at 823. 
78 Id. at 822. 
79 Id. 
80 EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 14. 
81 Id. 
82 See, e.g., HOMBERT ET AL., SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT MAKE IT SAFE TO START A BUSINESS? 
EVIDENCE FROM A FRENCH REFORM 2 (2013) (“Over the last decade, policy makers and academics 
alike have embraced entrepreneurship as a panacea for many economic challenges.”); Henrekson, supra 
note 69, at 718 (“Since the days of Adam Smith, Joseph Schumpeter, and Friedrich Hayek, most 
economists have acknowledged the crucial importance of entrepreneurs for growth and for the 
organization of economic activity.”); Licht, supra note 71, at 817 (“Fostering entrepreneurship has 
become a central policy goal for economic institutions around the world, ranging from regional to 
national to international bodies.  Underlying this trend is the belief that entrepreneurship is key for a 
number of desirable social outcomes, including economic growth, lower unemployment, and 
technological modernization.”). 
83 Edward P. Lazear, Entrepreneurship 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
9109, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9109.pdf. 
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older companies are not as capable at innovating and capitalizing on new 
ideas as smaller-sized start-up firms.84  For instance, the 2013 Index of 
Economic Freedom cites to a variety of research findings that new firms 
are generally more likely to license new technology and smaller-sized firms 
are about twice as likely to file “high-impact” patents as larger firms.85  
Researchers have also shown that business turnover is closely linked to 
higher wages, increased worker productivity, and overall economic 
growth.86  In comparison to incumbent firms whose employment levels had 
recently fallen, a study of unemployment reform in France found that 
wages and worker productivity levels were higher in newly created firms.87  
Within a period of two years after their creation, the value added per 
worker was 7,000 euros per year higher for newly created firms than that of 
incumbent firms.88  The employees of newly created firms also made 
annual wages that were approximately 5,200 euros greater than the salaries 
of workers employed by the incumbent firms.89  Based on these findings, 
the study concluded that the “labor reallocation process from incumbents to 
start-ups can have a positive impact on aggregate productivity, since newly 
created firms in the data are on average more productive.”90  Comparing 
the top firms of 44 different countries in 1975 with their 1996 counterparts, 
another study found that countries with higher rates of firm turnover 
experience faster per capita economic growth, greater productivity, and 
faster capital growth.91 
By enhancing economic vitality and innovation, entrepreneurship 
could offer France a valuable solution to the difficulties of remaining 
competitive and generating growth.  The WEF identifies three stages of 
economic development at which countries are faced with different 
challenges related to international competitiveness.92  France falls under the 
third and final stage, where economic development is “innovation-driven” 
and entrepreneurial growth is critical to the country’s continued financial 
well-being.93  At the innovation-driven stage, countries can only sustain 
their high wages and associated standards of living by fostering businesses 
that can compete with “new and/or unique products, services, models, and 
 
84 HERITAGE FOUND., 2013 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 63 (2013), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2013/countries/france.pdf (“[B]ig firms, encumbered by larger 
internal bureaucracies, are virtually incapable of capitalizing on radical ideas.”). 
85 Id. 
86 Kathy Fogel, Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Big Business Stability and Economic Growth: Is 
What’s Good for General Motors Good for America?, 89 J. OF FIN. ECON. 83 (2008). 
87 HOMBERT ET AL., supra note 82, at 5. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 27. 
90 Id. at 5. 
91 HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 84. 
92 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013, supra note 31, at 8–9. 
93 Id. at 9. 
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processes.”94  In order to successfully produce new goods and services, 
these businesses need to be capable of deploying “new technologies . . . 
and/or the most sophisticated production processes or business models.”95 
In order to capitalize on a country’s innovative potential and generate 
economic growth, government institutions need to develop a regulatory 
framework and infrastructure that encourages higher rates of 
entrepreneurial activity.96  The following section therefore examines the 
role of institutional factors in shaping entrepreneurial activity by balancing 
the inherent uncertainty of creating a business with reductions in the costs 
of entrepreneurial risk. 
 
C.  Law-Making Institutions and Entrepreneurial Activity 
 
Although cultural and social factors, as well as individual 
characteristics, influence entrepreneurship,97 government institutions and 
the legal frameworks that they establish can also play a critical role in 
shaping entrepreneurial activity.98 
In an overview of recent scholarship on entrepreneurship, one 
commentator remarked that “[t]he role of institutions has in recent years re-
emerged as a dominant explanation of long-term economic performance.”99  
Contributing to this view, recent studies have shown that very few 
differences in self-employment rates actually attribute to observable worker 
characteristics, which suggests that institutions can play an important role 




96 EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 14; Thomas S. Ulen, Why Do Entrepreneurs 
Appear and Flourish?, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 775, 776 (2007) (observing that “there is 
widespread belief that growth necessitates creating an environment in which entrepreneurs can prosper”). 
97 Some scholars challenge the argument that legal regulations impose barriers to entrepreneurial 
development by contending that a purely legal approach fails to account for “national cultural attitudes 
toward business and the state.”  Providing Italy as an example, one scholar asserts that culture plays a 
pivotal role in determining whether laws are taken seriously or actually enforced.  In countries like 
Italy, where citizens show little concern with observing “minor” administrative and bureaucratic 
regulations, laws would only present insignificant obstacles to entrepreneurial development.  Richard P. 
Taub, Research on Entrepreneurship, Culture, and Law, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 893, 895 (2007). 
98 See, e.g., Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 70, at 154 (“[T]he legal system may provide an 
additional, yet ill-understood and hence underutilized mechanism to stimulate domestic 
entrepreneurship, one of the central pillars in revitalizing economic growth.”). 
99 Henrekson, supra note 69, at 721; see also Curtis J. Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin: Rethinking 
Law’s Relationship to the Economy—Implications for Policy, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 831, 831 (2009) 
(noting that the idea that “law is essential to economic development has a long and venerable history”). 
100 Raquel Fonseca et al., Entrepreneurship, Wealth, Liquidity Constraints, and Start-Up Costs, 28 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 637 (2007).  But see Marc Cowling & William D. Bygrave, 
Entrepreneurship, Welfare Provision, and Unemployment: Relationships Between Unemployment, 
Welfare Provision, and Entrepreneurship in Thirty-Seven Nations Participating in the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (Gem) 2002, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 617, 635 (2007) (questioning the 
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According to scholars, the law offers two central mechanisms for 
driving entrepreneurship.101  First, the law creates entrepreneurial 
opportunities through property rights, which ensure that entrepreneurs 
retain the benefits of their success.102  Second, measures that reduce entry 
costs can also foster favorable conditions for entrepreneurship by 
minimizing the regulatory and administrative burdens required of 
entrepreneurs.103  Although France already has a well-established and 
progressive body of property law, the law imposes a wide variety of 
regulatory requirements on entrepreneurs that raise entry costs.  
Consequently, the remainder of this Note will focus on France’s potential 
to raise rates of entrepreneurial activity through measures that reduce the 
entry costs associated with creating a business. 
 
1. Regulatory Barriers Discourage Entrepreneurial Growth 
 
In order to understand how law-making institutions can help stimulate 
entrepreneurship by reducing entry costs, one needs to first consider the 
specific ways in which regulations create barriers for entrepreneurial 
ventures.104  Rather than serving as a positive source of economic growth, 
many legal scholars argue that regulations exert a negative impact on 
entrepreneurial activity by raising the costs of starting a new business.105  
According to a 2007 study by Vesa Kanniainen and Panu Poutvaara, entry 
costs “operate like a tax on entrepreneurship” and excessive government 
 
ability of reforms that remove institutional barriers to promote entrepreneurship, “given that cultural 
aspects appear to play such an important role in defining peoples pre-disposition toward entrepreneurial 
activity”). 
101 In 1956, Willard Hurst advanced the theory that the legal system could be harnessed to promote 
“‘the release of individual creative energy’” through two important mechanisms for facilitating the 
creation of entrepreneurial opportunities: (1) “ensuring that entrepreneurs retain the benefits of their 
success”; and (2) “reducing the costs of action and even failure.”  Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 71, at 
1551–52. 
102 Id. at 1553–54. 
103 Id. at 1562. 
104 Vesa Kanniainen & Panu Poutvaara, Imperfect Transmission of Tacit Knowledge and Other 
Barriers to Entrepreneurship, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 675 (2007) (“To develop policies toward 
entrepreneurship, it is important to identify the barriers in the market for entrepreneurship to alleviate 
the effects of those distortions.”). 
105 Simon C. Parker, Law and The Economics of Entrepreneurship, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
695, 706 (2007) (“Overall, despite ongoing disagreement among researchers, both the theory and 
evidence point to somewhat stronger negative impacts on entrepreneurship and growth from regulation 
than positive or neutral effects.”); see also HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 84, at 88; Henrekson, supra 
note 69, at 720; Jolanda Hessels, André van Stel, Peter Brouwer & Sander Wennekers, Social Security 
Arrangements and Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 743 (2007); 
André van Stel, David J. Storey & A. Roy Thurik, The Effect of Business Regulations on Nascent and 
Young Business Entrepreneurship, 28 SMALL BUS. ECON. 171 (2007); Martin T. Robson, Does Stricter 
Employment Protection Legislation Promote Self-employment?, 21 SMALL BUS. ECON. 309, 310 
(2003). 
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regulation “results in reduced enterprise formation.”106  Extensive and 
complex regulatory requirements impose entry barriers and limit the ability 
of entrepreneurial ventures to grow by (1) restricting operational flexibility; 
and (2) raising transaction costs that disproportionately impact small 
businesses. 
Employment protection legislation (EPL), for instance, can exercise a 
significant impact on levels of entrepreneurship and serve as an instructive 
example of how too much regulation can impede economic growth.  
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), employment protection encompasses regulations 
regarding job creation and termination.107  Regulations over job creation 
can encompass rules favoring particular disadvantaged groups, conditions 
for using temporary or fixed-term contracts, and employee training 
requirements.108  Regulations governing termination establish redundancy 
procedures, mandate notification periods and severance payments, and 
institute special requirements for collective dismissals.109  In assessing the 
ease of conducting business in various countries, the World Bank asserts 
that the rigidity of a nation’s employment laws over hiring and firing 
“sheds light on how easy or difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open 
and run a small to medium-size business.”110 
First, rigid labor laws that limit operational flexibility prevent growth 
by restricting new businesses from adapting workforce personnel to their 
evolving business needs.111  In an open economy with changing market 
conditions, businesses require the flexibility to rapidly readjust the size of 
their workforce based on shifts in performance and rates of return.112  The 
efficiency and flexibility of the labor market is also critical for ensuring 
that workers are allocated to their most effective use in the economy and 
provided with sufficient incentives to work to the best of their ability.113  
Therefore, labor markets as well as entrepreneurs benefit from the ability to 
rapidly shift workers from one economic activity to another at low cost.114 
Second, overly restrictive employment laws deter entrepreneurial 
ventures by raising the transaction costs of running a new business.115  
Because small- and medium-sized firms cannot afford the hiring and firing 
 
106 Kanniainen & Poutvaara, supra note 104, at 680. 
107 Parker, supra note 105, at 704. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 ECONOMY PROFILE: FRANCE, supra note 65, at 4. 
111 EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 17. 
112 Id. at 18. 
113 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013, supra note 31, at 6. 
114 Id. 
115 Juan Pablo Couyoumdjian, Who Walks out? Entrepreneurship in a Global Economy, 32 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 158, 161 (2012) (observing that “as agents find it less profitable to engage in entrepreneurial 
activities we will observe a lower overall level of entrepreneurship and, thus, lower economic growth”). 
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costs imposed by employment protection legislation, “[i]t is commonly 
argued that EPL retards entrepreneurship by disproportionately imposing 
burdens on the smallest firms.”116 
By imposing burdens on small- and medium-sized businesses, overly 
restrictive employment laws can create barriers to entrepreneurial success 
and discourage the type of risk taking required to launch a new business.  
EPL illustrates how an extensive regulatory framework can ultimately harm 
a country’s growth prospects by preventing entrepreneurship.  Accordingly, 
scholars have expressed dismay that governments continue to tighten 
regulations while also proclaiming the values of entrepreneurship.117  
Instead, lawmakers should actively promote growth by reducing the costs 
of entrepreneurial risk through deregulation measures. 
 
2.  Regulatory Relaxation Encourages Entrepreneurial Activity 
 
Rather than raising transaction costs and restricting entrepreneurial 
flexibility, reforms that reduce the costs of entrepreneurial risk-taking can 
stimulate heightened levels of entrepreneurship.  Policies of deregulation 
and institutional measures to protect entrepreneurs if their endeavors fail 
are therefore two potentially influential mechanisms for raising rates of 
entrepreneurship. 
First, one critical way to encourage entrepreneurship is by 
implementing policies of deregulation.  Influenced by a system of “crony 
capitalism,” politicians have a tendency to represent the interests of 
established businesses to the detriment of new economic entrants.118  
Politicians can therefore deploy taxes, fees, and regulations, which all serve 
as barriers to entry, to help entrench incumbent firms and block 
entrepreneurial action.119  According to the Legal Origins Theory, however, 
the law matters because it has the potential to facilitate transactions and 
drive economic development by eliminating barriers to entry.120  Under this 
 
116 Parker, supra note 105, at 704; see also Henrekson, supra note 69, at 738 (“[A]ny costs imposed 
by labor security regulation are likely to fall more heavily on younger, smaller, and less capital-
intensive employers.  To the extent that entrepreneurial firms are overrepresented in these categories, 
labor security regulation disproportionally burdens entrepreneurial firms.”). 
117 Parker, supra note 105, at 706. 
118 Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 71, at 1565; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 899–900 (1987) (Analyzing empirical evidence 
regarding United States legislative politics, Farber and Frickey observe that the greater economic 
interests of their constituencies do not influence legislators’ votes.  Instead, they theorize “(1) that 
reelection is an important motive of legislators; (2) that constituent and contributor interests thus 
influence legislators; and (3) that small, easily organized interest groups have an influence 
disproportionate to the size of their membership.”).  Id. 
119 Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 71, at 1565. 
120 See, e.g., id. at 1563–64; Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 
46 J. ECON. LIT. 285, 306–309 (2008); Milhaupt, supra note 99. 
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line of reasoning, governments can and should actively promote growth 
and competitiveness by implementing policies of deregulation: “[I]f 
governments can overcome entrenched interests and institute policies of 
deregulation that do not harm their other social objectives, they may be 
able to seize a precious opportunity to stimulate entrepreneurship and 
greater competitiveness by easing the burden of regulation on small 
businesses.”121 
Second, government policies that shield entrepreneurs from economic 
failure can also stimulate entrepreneurship.122  For example, one study 
examining the impact of French labor reforms targeted at the unemployed 
found that government subsidies that provide economic insurance to 
entrepreneurs in the case of failure increased rates of entrepreneurial 
activity.123  According to the study, the reform’s implementation was 
followed by a 25% increase in monthly business creation rates across 
industries.124 
Furthermore, reform measures that facilitate entrepreneurial entry do 
not appear to decrease the quality of entrepreneurs or contribute to the 
creation of a greater number of unsuccessful business endeavors.  
According to the study conducted on French employment reform, the 
reform did not alter the educational background of business founders, 
which were not “significantly different” from the background of business 
founders prior to the reform.125  The reform also led to the creation of more 
“ambitious” firms that were more likely to hire.126  In comparison to 
control groups, entrepreneurs operating in industries impacted by the 
reform were 3.8% more likely to have plans to hire in the next twelve 
months.127  As a result of these findings, researchers concluded that “[t]he 
reduction in the cost of entry triggered by the reform then allows for a 
larger pool of equally talented people to enter self-employment.”128 
Countries that implement policies to balance the uncertainty of 
bringing new ideas to the market with reductions in the costs of 
entrepreneurial risk can thus actively promote growth.  However, extensive 
legal regulations that restrict entrepreneurial flexibility and thus raise 
transaction costs deter would-be entrepreneurs from bringing new ideas to 
the market.  At the moment, French employment laws discourage 
 
121 Parker, supra note 105, at 707–08; see also Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 71 at 1565 (“Any legal 
system that wishes to promote entrepreneurial action must employ mechanisms that constrain the 
inevitable pressure to favor incumbent firms.”). 
122 Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 71, at 1562 (“[I]f we want entrepreneurs to exploit entrepreneurial 
opportunities, we must also reduce the costs of their failure.”). 
123 HOMBERT ET AL., supra note 82, at 6. 
124 Id. at 4. 
125 Id. at 22–23. 
126 Id. at 4. 
127 Id. at 23. 
128 Id. at 19. 
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entrepreneurial activity by imposing excessive regulations on business 
start-ups.  The following section therefore examines specific French laws 
that inhibit entrepreneurship through the over regulation of the labor 
market. 
 
IV.  FRENCH EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LAWS INHIBIT 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY AND STIFLE GROWTH 
 
By focusing on worker-protective norms, and eschewing a liberal 
view of the role of law, French employment law contributes to an anti-
business environment that impedes entrepreneurial growth.  After 
providing a brief legal framework for French employment law, this part 
will highlight specific regulatory measures that are harmful to business 
start-ups, first looking at rigid hiring and firing procedures that raise the 
cost of entrepreneurial risk taking and encourage workplace inefficiency.  
Next, this part will demonstrate how complex statutory regulations that are 
triggered by expansions in workforce personnel restrict business growth 
and lead to inefficient allocations of French labor resources after the 
employment relationship is created.  Finally, this part will conclude by 
discussing how large social security payments impose prohibitive costs on 
small- to medium-sized businesses and remove incentives to engage in 
entrepreneurial activity. 
 
A.  Legal Framework for French Employment Law 
 
In the French system, employment law, or droit du travail, 
encompasses both “labor law” and “employment law.”129  While French 
labor law involves such issues as industrial relations, unionization, and 
collective bargaining, employment law covers issues like individual labor 
contracts, redundancy, and anti-discrimination regulation.130  In France, 
both labor and employment law implement norms that derive from several 
sources: constitutional law, statutory law, case law, collective agreements, 
and individual contracts.131  This Note will predominantly focus on aspects 
of French employment law governed by statutes codified in the French 
Labor Code or Code du travail, specifically looking at labor contracts 
within the context of hiring and firing laws, legal regulations associated 
with workplace size, and social security laws.  Generally, legal scholars 
characterize French statutes, including the Code du travail, as much more 
detailed and rigid than those of their European counterparts.132  Whereas 
 
129 François Gaudu, Labour Law, in INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 395, 395 (George A. 
Bermann & Etienne Picard eds., 2008). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 397. 
132 Id. at 398. 
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other European countries, like Germany, leave many of the details of 
implementation to collective bargaining, very detailed French regulations 
place greater constraints on employer flexibility and “make law difficult to 
understand for ordinary people.”133 
In addition to the legal complexity of the French statutory law 
codified in the Code du travail, two different characterizations of the 
appropriate role for the state in shaping the national labor market have an 
impact on employers.  On the one hand, a liberal, free-market approach 
asserts that sources of employment law should merely provide a legal 
framework to validate private employment agreements and provide for 
their enforcement.134  On the other hand, an alternative approach 
emphasizes the importance of maintaining “social public order,” or l’ordre 
public social, by establishing a protective framework for worker’s rights.135  
Because workers are subordinated to their employers under the 
employment contract, this second approach stresses the need for a certain 
degree of state protection.136  Adopting a worker-protective approach, 
French judges often resolve employment disputes based on the principle 
that “the norm that is most advantageous for employees shall prevail.”137  
Employers lose around 75% of the cases brought to French labor courts,138 
and roughly one out of every four French employees brings a case to these 
courts, which have been described as “the least business-friendly in 
Europe.”139 
Ultimately, the complexity of French employment law and the French 
legal system’s emphasis on worker protection is reflected by the country’s 
hiring and firing procedures, the laws governing business expansion, and 
the social security regime, all of which limit employer flexibility, 
encourage workplace inefficiency and raise transaction costs. 
 
B.  Restrictions on Hiring Flexibility 
 
In France, the act of entering into an employment contract activates a 
variety of mandatory statutory rules and collective labor agreements.140  
 
133 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 398–99. 
134 Mark Freedland, Beyond the Public Law/Private Law Dichotomy: Employment Law, in 
PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 483, 487 (2d ed. 2008). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 399. 
138 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 68 (2004) [hereinafter 
OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK], available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EO68_MAIN. 
139 Matthew Melchiorre, France’s Disappointing Labor Reforms, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0205/France-s-disappointing-labor-reforms. 
140 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 397.  One well-known example of this is the infamous 35-hour 
workweek, which was implemented by law no. 2000-37 of 19 January 2000 and is more popularly 
known as the Loi Aubry.  Loi Aubry reduced the basic working week from 39 hours to 35 hours.  When 
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Consequently, employers are automatically bound by a variety of 
obligations that they cannot contract away.141  Furthermore, regardless of 
how two parties characterize their relationship, they are deemed to have 
entered into an employment contract whenever a worker accepts a 
relationship of “subordination” to an employer by performing services for 
the employer in consideration for wages.142  Several different forms of 
employment contracts exist in France, including: open-ended or fixed-term 
contracts, full-time or part-time contracts, and contracts based on direct 
recruitment or indirect recruitment through a temporary employment 
agency.143 
Despite what appears to be a variety of options, however, employers 
often lack the flexibility to select the employment relationship that best 
suits their business needs.  Although the French legal system technically 
recognizes several types of employment contracts, the predominant type is 
an open-ended, full-time contract with an unspecified duration.144  This 
type of contract is called the contrat de travail à durée indeterminée (the 
CDI) and is presumptively favored by French courts.145  As a result, French 
employment law has been described as creating a dual employment 
structure, pitting the CDI as the most common contractual arrangement 
against all the other less common forms of temporary and fixed-term 
contracts.146  The CDI represents around 90% of total employment.147 
The prominence of the CDI is the product of a number of French 
statutory measures that limit an employer’s ability to freely fashion the type 
of employment relationship that best suits his or her business needs.  
Whereas no conditions need to be satisfied in order to form a CDI, every 
other employment contract must conform to strict statutory conditions.148  
For example, French law prohibits employers from relying on fixed-term or 
temporary employment contracts for most jobs considered to fulfill the 
durable and long-term needs of an employer’s business.149  In France, 
 
employees enter into an employment contract, there is an entire legal regime just concerning working 
time, night work, rest periods, and holidays, which is structured on “the basic pillars of the 35-hour 
week.”  According to scholarly commentators, “[t]he resulting provisions . . . form an immensely 
complex regime for the control of working time, in which legislation and collective bargaining (or 
réglementation) are very elaborately intertwined.”  Freedland, supra note 134, at 501. 
141 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 397. 
142 Id. 
143 M. JEAN-CLAUDE JAVILLIER, MANUEL DE DROIT DU TRAVAIL [EMPLOYMENT LAW] 186–87 (4th 
ed. 1992). 
144 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 401. 
145 Id. 
146 Vranceanu, supra note 44. 
147 Id. 
148 CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1242-1 (Fr.); JAVILLIER, supra note 143, at 187. 
149 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 401.  The French Code du travail prohibits the use of fixed-term 
contracts for permanent tasks and limits the maximum length of fixed-term contracts to eighteen 
months, subject to some minor exceptions.  ECONOMY PROFILE: FRANCE, supra note 65, at 106. 
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fixed-term contracts are created by the contrat de travail à durée 
determinée (CDD)150 and temporary work contracts are formed by the 
contrat de travail à temporaire (CTT).151  French courts interpret the 
statutory language governing the CDD as expressly prohibiting employers 
from offering fixed-term contracts for positions that are not of a “temporary 
nature.”152  Courts have also blocked efforts on the part of employers to 
circumvent the open-ended, full-time CDI by engaging the same workers 
under multiple successive contracts that only last for a limited duration.153  
According to a decision by the Cour de cassation, which is France’s 
highest court for judicial matters, employer reliance on multiple CDDs 
“requires verification that the recourse to successive CDDs is justified.”154  
In order to make this justification, employers need to present “concrete 
elements establishing the temporary nature of the position in question.”155 
Furthermore, employment relationships created by the CDDs and 
CTTs, or any other contractual arrangements other than the CDI, trigger 
other additional statutory requirements that restrict employer flexibility 
with respect to scheduling and assigning work hours.  For example, 
employers are often required to set a predetermined work schedule for part-
time employees and the law limits the employer’s ability to assign 
additional hours or depart from the pre-determined schedule.156  All of 
these restrictions reinforce a “very strong insistence” within French 
employment law on the use of CDIs, reflecting the legal system’s 
preference for full-time, open-ended employment relationships.157 
By focusing disproportionately on worker protection and understating 
the interests of private employers, rigid hiring practices limit the type of 
workforce flexibility required by entrepreneurs.  In particular, the treatment 
of the CDI as France’s default employment contract is significant because 
 
150 CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1242-1 (Fr.) (“Un contrat de travail à durée déterminée, quel 
que soit son motif, ne peut avoir ni pour objet ni pour effet de pourvoir durablement un emploi lié à 
l’activité normale et permanente de l’entreprise.”); Freedland, supra note 134, at 497. 
151 CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1251-1 (Fr.); Freedland, supra note 134, at 497. 
152 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Dec. 12, 2012, Bull. civ. 
V, No. 22302 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Sept. 26, 2012, 
Bull. civ. V, No. 26019 (Fr.). 
153 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., June 22, 2011, Bull. civ. 
V, No. 6944 (Fr.) (finding that employer mislabeled worker as a CDD employee where the employer 
had engaged the employee for multiple successive limited-term contracts); Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Mar. 24, 2010, Bull. civ. V, No. 42186 (Fr.) (reclassifying 
employee engaged by employer under 23 CDDs as having CDI status). 
154 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., June 22, 2011, Bull. civ. V, 
No. 6944 (Fr.) (“[L]’utilisation de contrats à durée déterminée successifs, impose de vérifier que le 
recours à l’utilisation de contrats successifs est justifié par des raisons objectives qui s’entendent de 
l’existence d’éléments concrets établissant le caractère par nature temporaire de l’emploi.”). 
155 Id. 
156 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 401. 
157 Freedland, supra note 134, at 497–98. 
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it severely restricts the ability of employers to adapt workforce personnel to 
the evolving needs of their businesses.158  For new business ventures, every 
job is important and hiring entails both a great deal of risk as well as a 
significant expense in terms of screening, interviewing, and training.159  
Entrepreneurs need the flexibility to adapt their business model and the size 
of their workforce to an evolving and unpredictable market.  By effectively 
forcing employers to create full-time, long-term contracts, and thus 
preventing employers from freely creating the employment relationship 
that best suits their needs, French employment law elevates the costs of 
entrepreneurial risk taking.  Employment protection legislation that restricts 
hiring flexibility by limiting the way employers characterize the 
employment relationship, therefore, places entrepreneurs at a disadvantage 
from the earliest stages of business development.160 
 
C.  Restrictions on Firing Flexibility 
 
Rigid firing procedures are an additional and closely associated 
obstacle to entrepreneurial growth that limit the employer’s flexibility and 
increase the risks of starting a business.  In France, employee dismissals, 
regardless of the cause, are costly and entail a great deal of legal 
complexity.  Employers are almost always required to give notice and 
provide for a dismissal allowance, the level of which depends on the 
dismissed employee’s seniority.161  The World Bank calculates a 
“redundancy cost indicator” measuring the overall cost of “advance notice 
payments, severance payments and penalties due when terminating a 
redundant worker” as expressed in weeks of the terminated worker’s 
salary.162  In France, for a worker with ten years of tenure, employers pay 
the equivalent of 8.7 weeks of the terminated worker’s salary in severance 
costs.163  Averaging dismissal costs for workers with one, five, and ten 
years of tenure, employers pay the equivalent of 4.6 weeks of a dismissed 
worker’s salary in severance payments and other costs.164 
In addition to the expense of dismissing an employee, employers can 
only terminate their employees for reasons recognized under the French 
Code du travail and often need to satisfy a variety of other termination 
requirements, which are determined based on the employer’s rationale for 
 
158 JAVILLIER, supra note 143, at 222–23. 
159 See Parker, supra note 105, at 704. 
160 Id. 
161 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 401. 
162 WORLD BANK & INT’L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS 2014, ECONOMY PROFILE: FRANCE 102 
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dismissal.165  Although it might seem as though an employer should be free 
to terminate an employee under an open-ended CDI with no-fixed term, in 
practice, these contracts cannot be terminated “unless very stringent 
conditions are filled.”166  There are two separate justifications that can 
provide French employers with grounds for terminating an employment 
relationship: (1) economic dismissals, which are connected to the economic 
situation of the employer; and (2) non-economic dismissals, which are 
connected to the behavior or performance of the terminated worker.167  
Although economic dismissals and non-economic dismissals entail 
different procedural requirements, both forms of dismissal interfere with 
the employer’s ability to manage his or her own workforce. 
 
1.  Economic Dismissals 
 
French employers must satisfy a variety of highly specific, complex, 
and costly requirements to terminate economically redundant employees.  
In order to justify economic dismissals, employers need to meet three basic 
conditions: they must (1) show that they have an economic reason for the 
dismissal that is both “real and serious” (une cause réelle et sérieuse); (2) 
satisfy certain procedural requirements; and (3) undertake an “employment 
maintenance plan” or “social plan” to try and re-establish dismissed 
workers, in the case of collective dismissals.168 
First, economic reasons for dismissal encompass financial difficulties, 
technological change, or any business reorganizations necessary to 
maintain competitiveness.169  However, when the dismissal is adjudicated, 
French judges apply a proportionality principle in determining whether the 
economic motive is sufficiently serious.170  The judicial proportionality test 
entails weighing the advantages an employer derives from dismissal against 
the detriment suffered by the dismissed employee.171  If a judge concludes 
that the harm experienced by the employee outweighs the advantages 
sought by the employer, then the employer is found to lack the real and 
serious grounds required for dismissal.172 
Second, employers must notify the appropriate administrative 
authority of the dismissal, and demonstrate that they complied with the 
appropriate standard dismissal procedures, which may vary depending on 
 
165 Amanda K. Caldwell, Employment Law in France: The Basics, FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP (Jan. 22, 
2013), http://www.crossborderemployer.com/post/2013/01/22/Employment-Law-in-France-The-Basics.aspx. 
166 Vranceanu, supra note 44. 
167 Freedland, supra note 134, at 495. 
168 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 402. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 401–02. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
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whether the employer is implementing an individual or collective 
dismissal.173  As part of this process, the administrative authority has the 
discretion to review such matters as the employer’s economic reasons for 
dismissal, the number of positions eliminated and the category of the 
workers affected, the criteria used to select which workers to dismiss, and 
the measures taken to re-establish the terminated workers.174 
Third, employers have a duty to attempt to re-establish employees 
dismissed based on economic grounds due to collective redundancies.  In 
order to satisfy this duty, employers with fifty or more employees who 
dismiss more than ten employees over a thirty-day time period must 
prepare a “social plan,” or “employment maintenance plan,” referred to in 
French as a plan social or plan de sauvegarde d’emploi.175  The employment 
maintenance plan provides an overview of how the employer handled the 
economic redundancy as well as their justifications for dismissal.176  The 
purpose of the maintenance plan is to demonstrate that the employer 
considered all of the available alternatives to dismissal, such as proposals 
“to transfer workers, to change the terms and conditions of employment, to 
transfer workers to other companies within a holding group, to order 
outplacement, and to institute training measures.”177 
Employers must both consult with a Comité d’entreprise, referred to 
in English as a “Works Council,” regarding the maintenance plan and then 
submit the plan to the Directeur départemental du travail for 
administrative approval.178  However, as a substitute to preparing a 
maintenance plan and meeting all the other statutory requirements for 
economic dismissals, sometimes employers will simply make arrangements 
with employees directly, providing them with early retirement or cash 
bonuses to encourage less burdensome “voluntary” departures as an 
informal means of working around the law.179 
 
2.  Non-Economic Dismissals 
 
The legal requirements for non-economic dismissals also disfavor 
employers and leave French judges with broad discretion to apply worker-
 
173 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Detailed Information on Employment Protection: France, 
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/France.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Employment Protection]; 
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 403. 
174 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 403. 
175 CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1233-61 (Fr.) (“Dans les entreprises d’au moins cinquante 
salariés, lorsque le projet de licenciement concerne au moins dix salariés dans une même période de 
trente jours, l’employeur établit et met en oeuvre un plan de sauvegarde de l’emploi pour éviter les 
licenciements ou en limiter le nombre.”). 
176 CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1233-62 (Fr.); Freedland, supra note 134, at 495–96. 
177 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 403. 
178 Employment Protection, supra note 173; Gaudu, supra note 129, at 403. 
179 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 403. 
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protective norms.  Similar to the first requirement for economic dismissals, 
an employer must establish that they have a “real and serious cause” (une 
cause réelle et sérieuse de licenciement) for the termination of an employee 
in a non-economic dismissal.180  In principle, this requirement can be 
satisfied by a variety of circumstances: disciplinary misconduct, loss of 
confidence, professional inadequacy, and illness.181  According to scholarly 
commentators, however, courts have applied this requirement 
inconsistently, and “a real and serious cause can be found to exist just as 
easily when a worker has committed some misconduct as it can be found to 
exist in the absence of misconduct.”182 
French judges have broad discretion in determining whether an 
employer has demonstrated a real and serious cause for termination.  If a 
non-economic dismissal results in litigation, Article L1235-1 of the Code 
du travail stipulates that, whenever a doubt exists as to whether the 
employer has proven that termination is warranted under the real and 
serious cause requirement, the judge should hold in favor of the 
employee.183  France’s constitutional court, the Conseil constitutionnel, has 
even upheld the constitutionality of this provision, reasoning that, so long 
as proper civil procedures are observed and the judge has an opportunity to 
weigh the evidence presented by both sides, “judicial control over the legal 
conditions for termination [in favor of the employee] is in no way contrary 
to the principle of equality before the law.”184  The unpredictability that 
results from such broad judicial discretion may explain why the majority of 
employee dismissals are economic in nature.185 
For both economic and non-economic dismissals alike, France’s 
stringent requirements governing firing procedures prevent firms from 
terminating poor-performing and redundant employees, which increases the 
production costs of running a new business and severely limits the 
efficiency of a firm’s business operations.186  Rigid French dismissal laws 
 
180 Id. at 402. 
181 JAVILLIER, supra note 143, at 234–36. 
182 Id. at 233 (“Il peut donc exister une cause reelle et serieuse lorsqu’une faute a ete commise par 
le salarie, comme en absence d’une telle faute.”). 
183 CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1235-1 (Fr.) (“En cas de litige, le juge, à qui il appartient 
d’apprécier la régularité de la procédure suivie et le caractère réel et sérieux des motifs invoqués par 
l’employeur, forme sa conviction au vu des éléments fournis par les parties après avoir ordonné, au 
besoin, toutes les mesures d’instruction qu’il estime utiles.  Si un doute subsiste, il profite au salarié.”) 
(emphasis added). 
184 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 89-257DC, July 25, 1989, Rec. 
59 (Fr.) (“[L]e contrôle juridictionnel des conditions légales du licenciement, ne sont en rien contraires 
au principe d’égalité des citoyens devant la loi.”); JAVILLIER, supra note 143, at 232–33. 
185 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 402. 
186 HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 84, at 90 (“The ability of businesses to contract freely for labor 
and dismiss redundant workers when they are no longer needed is a vital mechanism for enhancing 
productivity and sustaining overall economic growth.”). 
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not only force firms to retain poor performers and redundant employees, 
but also increase the likelihood of poor employee performance.  When 
employment protection legislation shields workers from the job market, 
studies indicate that workers are less efficient and exert less effort than they 
would under more competitive circumstances.187 
Labeling this phenomenon as the “X-inefficiency,” economist Harvey 
Leigenstein explains: “In situations where competitive pressure is light, 
many people will trade the disutility of greater effort, or search for the 
utility of feeling less pressure.”188  According to Leigenstein, in the absence 
of competitive market conditions, employees appear less compelled to 
work effectively and expend less personal effort at performing their jobs 
well.189  As a result, operational expenses in an “X-inefficient” firm will be 
greater than those in a competitive firm where labor regulations do not 
protect workers from the free market.190  In this respect, France’s onerous 
termination procedures disadvantage entrepreneurs by not only raising the 
costs of risk, but also by contributing to lower rates of productivity and 
efficiency. 
 
D.  Legal Constraints on Expansion 
 
One of the key factors contributing to the declining competitiveness of 
France, as well as Europe, is the failure to generate “new businesses 
destined for growth.”191  Prior to the market crash in 2008, Europe already 
trailed behind the U.S. in producing new businesses.  Only twelve new 
companies from Europe broke into the top 500 public companies from 
1950 to 2007, whereas America contributed fifty-two new companies.192  
Additionally, in the 1990s, one study found that while 19 percent of mid-
sized American firms could be characterized as “fast-growers,” the same 
characterization was true of only 4 percent of the companies in six 
European countries, including France.193 
French employment protection legislation penalizes growing 
businesses by requiring firms to satisfy costly and complex legal 
requirements as they increase in size, thus discouraging the type of growth 
the country needs.  Looking at the relationship between employment 
regulations that significantly raise labor costs once French firms reach 50 
employees and French firm size, a study conducted by researchers at the 
London School of Economics found that France has a surprisingly large 
 
187 Id. at 61. 
188 Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. ‘X-Efficiency,’ 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392, 413 (1966). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 European Entrepreneurs: Les Misérables, ECONOMIST, July 28, 2012, at 30. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
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number of companies with forty-nine employees, whereas this is not the 
case in American firms.194  In 2008, a French commission charged with 
writing a report on growth found that once an enterprise employs fifty 
workers, no fewer than thirty-four laws and regulations start to apply.195  
According to the commission’s report, the cost of these regulations 
amounts to 4 percent of a firm’s total payroll.196 
Thus, the empirical data indicates that, when determining firm size, 
many small business owners are influenced by considerations weighing the 
benefits of expansion against the costs of increased labor regulation.197  
Based on their findings that far fewer French firms expand on the same 
scale as productive U.S. firms, researchers at the London School of 
Economics concluded that French employment regulations offer an 
“attractive” explanation for the country’s productivity gap.198  In order to 
avoid costly labor regulations, many highly productive firms fail to reach 
their optimal size, which contributes to a misallocation of French labor 
resources and harms entrepreneurial growth.199 
 
E.  Social Security Costs 
 
Due to its robust public welfare system, France is one of the most 
successful countries in the world at minimizing income disparities between 
the wealthy and the poor.200  However, France’s national social security 
 
194 Luis Garicano, Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen, Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity 
Distribution: Evidence from France 2, 15 (London Sch. of Econ., Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Working 
Paper, 2012), available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1128.pdf (Out of the total number of 
French firms researched, “[t]here are just over 400 firms with exactly 49 employees and then only about 
130 with 50 employees.”). 
195 JACQUES ATTALI, RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION POUR LA LIBÉRATION DE CROISSANCE 
FRANÇAISE [COMMISSION REPORT ON THE DEREGULATION OF FRENCH ECONOMIC GROWTH] 48 (2008), 
available at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/084000041/0000.pdf; 
Special Report, supra note 55. 
196 Id. (“Les seuils sociaux constituent aujourd’hui un frein à la croissance et à la création d’emploi.  
À titre d’exemple, le passage de 49 à 50 salariés entraîne actuellement l’application de 34 législations et 
réglementations supplémentaires dont le coût représente 4% de la masse salariale.”). 
197 Special Report, supra note 55. 
198 Garicano, Lelarge & Reenen, supra note 194, at 15. 
199 Id. at 21 (“Intuitively, firms will optimally choose to remain small to avoid the regulation, so the 
size distribution becomes distorted with ‘too many’ firms just below the size threshold and ‘too few’ 
firms just above it.  Furthermore, the distribution of productivity is also distorted: some of those firms 
just below the cut-off are ‘too productive’ as they have been prevented from growing to their optimal 
size by the regulation.  We show how the regulation creates welfare losses by (i) allocating too little 
employment to more productive firms who choose to be just below the regulatory threshold, (ii) 
allocating too little employment to more productive firms because they bear the implicit labor tax 
(whereas small firms do not) and (iii) through reducing equilibrium wages (due to some tax incidence 
falling on workers) this encourages too many individuals to become small entrepreneurs rather than 
working as employees for more productive entrepreneurs.”). 
200 Using the Gini coefficient as a rough measure of inequality, which ranges from 0 (representing 
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system, the Sécurité sociale more commonly referred to as Sécu, imposes 
burdensome costs on employers.201  Sécu is a compulsory insurance that 
provides for healthcare, pensions, family allowances, and unemployment 
benefits to employees.202  Healthcare, pension, and unemployment benefits 
are allowances that depend, at least in part, on the level of an employee’s 
wages, while family allowances are granted regardless of income.203  Sécu 
is funded by a tax on jobs that is unevenly shared by workers and 
employers, with most of the burden falling on employers.204  In 2007, in 
order to fund employer Sécu contributions both large and small, French 
companies were found to pay the equivalent of a 42.3% tax on top of each 
employee’s salary in comparison to the equivalent of a 10.5% tax paid by 
UK employers for social security costs.205 
Sécu imposes higher labor costs on French employers than the social 
security regimes of most other European countries.206  According to a 
recent study, German companies pay 17 percent of workers’ gross salaries 
in social charges, whereas French companies pay 38 percent.207  With 
employer social-security contributions coming in at almost 30 percent of 
labor costs in 2011, France eclipses Italy, Sweden, Spain, Germany, and 
Britain in social charges.208  Furthermore, even in Italy, which has the 
highest social charges after France, social-security contributions amount to 
less than 25 percent of labor costs.209  As a result, the chief executive of 
Valeo, one of the world’s biggest car-parts companies, has been quoted 
saying that unaffordable employer social security contributions present one 
of the biggest problems for companies in France.210 
Having now examined some major deficiencies in French employment 
law that discourage entrepreneurial activity and hinder job creation, the 
following part will continue the analysis by suggesting some key areas 
where deregulation measures might help to stimulate growth. 
 
 
perfect equality) to 1 (representing perfect inequality), as of 2004, France reduced inequality to 0.248 
over the past quarter century.  In contrast, the United States has seen significant increases in the Gini 
coefficient over the same period and has a score of 0.450.  LIBR. OF CONG.–FED. RES. DIV., COUNTRY 
PROFILE: FRANCE (2007), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/France.pdf. 
201 Id. 
202 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 406. 
203 Id. 
204 LIBR. OF CONG.–FED. RES. DIV., supra note 200. 
205 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 404. 
206 LIBR. OF CONG.–FED. RES. DIV., supra note 200. 
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V.  ENCOURAGING ENTREPRENEURSHIP THROUGH FUTURE 
EMPLOYMENT REFORM 
 
On June 14, 2013, France enacted labor market reform through the Loi 
relative a la sécurisation de l’emploi, which is referred to in English as the 
“Law for the Security of Employment.”211  This law implemented a 
combination of reforms that were intended to enhance employer flexibility 
in the management of workforce personnel on the one hand, and to provide 
greater job security for employees and greater access to information 
regarding an employer’s business decisions on the other.212  However, a 
number of commentators have criticized the French reform as being too 
modest to bring about any substantive change in the country’s rigid labor 
market,213 and an article in the Christian Science Monitor reported that 
“France’s entrepreneur exodus and continued economic malaise signal the 
need for a labor overhaul, not a minor adjustment.”214 
Although the labor market and employment reforms enacted in June 
2013 were intended to address French problems with unemployment and 
declining competitiveness, the reforms fell short of implementing the kind 
of change that will be needed to significantly lower France’s high rate of 
unemployment, raise its levels of entrepreneurship, and revitalize the 
French economy.215  After first addressing the ways in which French 
employment law contributes to unemployment by harming employers and 
job seekers alike, this part offers some general insights and 
recommendations for the future.  Finally, by examining the 2013 reforms 
and focusing on specific areas where the Loi 2013-504 fell short, this part 
concludes with a prescriptive analysis for how the reforms could be 
improved upon to further enhance employer flexibility and reduce the cost 
of entrepreneurial risk taking. 
 
A.  Achieving the Goals of Employment Protection Legislation 
 
Although French regulations favoring open-ended contracts, rigid 
 
211 Special Report, supra note 55. 
212 The Loi relative à la sécurisation de l’emploi or the “Law for the Security of Employment” will 
hereinafter be referred to within the text of this Note as the Loi 2013-504.  Loi 2013-504 du 14 juin 2013 
relative à la sécurisation de l’emploi [Law 2013-504 of June 14, 2013 Relating to the Security of 
Employment], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
June 16, 2013; France Enacts the Labor Law Reform Act, MORGAN LEWIS (July 3, 2013) [hereinafter 
MORGAN LEWIS], http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/LEPG_LF_FranceEnactmentOfLaborLawReform 
Act_02july13.pdf. 
213 MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212. 
214 See, e.g., Hollande’s Modest Labor Reform: France Needs a Reagan Revolution, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Hollande’s Modest Labor Reform], http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 
10001424127887324235104578241292636563234; Melchiorre, supra note 139; Vranceanu, supra note 44. 
215 Melchiorre, supra note 139. 
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termination procedures, and mandatory employer services as firms increase 
in size originate from a desire to protect employees,216 none of these 
measures have proven successful at combating rising unemployment or 
economic stagnation within France.  In fact, the country’s worker-
protective approach to employment law is harmful to both employers and 
employees alike by discouraging entrepreneurial activity and preventing 
job creation.217  With a general unemployment rate of nearly 11 percent of 
the French population, and youth unemployment at more than 26 percent, 
more than 3 million people are jobless in France.218  France’s 
unemployment rate has consistently exceeded 8 percent for the last twenty 
years and has hovered near the 10 percent threshold for more than a third of 
the time.219  Due to France’s burdensome labor regulations and expensive 
social charges, however, both small and large businesses are reluctant to 
create new jobs.220 
Rather than actively contributing to job creation, the legal system 
actually encourages employers to engage in inefficient and informal 
employment practices geared toward avoiding restrictive labor laws.  For 
example, France has witnessed a significant rise in “atypical precarious 
forms of employment,” under which young professionals are being 
engaged for increasingly long trial periods in the hopes of eventually 
receiving an employment offer.221  The adverse effect of employment 
protection legislation is further illustrated by indications that French 
businesses are curtailing growth in order to avoid the heightened 
employment regulations that result when a firm employs more than fifty 
workers.222  French employment practices and the current growth crisis thus 
reflects scholarly research findings that, “[i]f institutions are such that it is 
beneficial for the individual to spend entrepreneurial effort on 
circumventing them, the individual will do so rather than benefiting from 
 
216 Id. (remarking that “[i]nstead of introducing needed flexibility into France’s rigid labor market, 
the [reform] merely tinkers around the edges”). 
217 Mark Freedland, Beyond the Public Law/Private Law Dichotomy: Employment Law, in 
PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 483, 487 (2d ed. 2008). 
218 According to the 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, “Onerous labor laws penalize businesses 
and workers alike.  Rigid labor regulations prevent employers and employees from freely negotiating 
changes in terms and conditions of work, resulting often in a chronic mismatch of labor supply and 
demand.”  HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 84, at 91. 
219 Steven Erlanger & David Jolly, French Lawmakers Loosen Labor Rules in a Victory for the 
President, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/ 
world/europe/french-lawmakers-loosen-labor-rules.html?_r=0; Special Report, supra note 55. 
220 LIBR. OF CONG.–FED. RES. DIV., supra note 200, at 18. 
221 Melchiorre, supra note 139 (“Businesses don’t want to take the risk of hiring an employee they 
can’t dismiss later.”); see also id. (“The unemployment and underemployment problem is often blamed 
on France’s robust labor regulation and high minimum wages, which are said to inhibit job creation and 
to price low-paid workers out of jobs.”); Special Report, supra note 55, at 6. 
222 Gaudu, supra note 129, at 404. 
HAMREN_FINAL_WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/14 7:24 PM 




given institutions to reduce uncertainty and enhance contract and product 
quality.”223 
Ultimately, France’s employment protection legislation not only 
deters entrepreneurial activity, but also harms the very workers that it was 
intended to protect by hindering job creation and blocking economic 
vitality.  Although the French legal system has operated in ways that 
discourage entrepreneurial activity, the law can also play an important role 
in fostering entrepreneurship and stimulating economic growth.  In fact, 
according to one scholar, in the context of the current global recession, “the 
legal system may provide an additional, yet ill-understood and hence 
underutilized mechanism to stimulate domestic entrepreneurship, one of the 
central pillars in revitalizing economic growth.”224 
 
B.  Enhancing Employer Flexibility and Reducing the Costs of 
Entrepreneurial Risk 
 
By restricting employer flexibility and increasing the cost of 
entrepreneurial risk, the rigidity of French employment law presents 
significant obstacles to entrepreneurial growth.  In order to undertake more 
successful reform measures, French policy makers and legislators need to 
recognize that entrepreneurs are self-serving agents who will only 
overcome the inherent risks of investment if the legal system increases their 
chances of making a return.225  Therefore, in order to make the law more 
responsive to the needs of emerging businesses, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger 
proposes that the law should play a dual role in encouraging 
entrepreneurship by reducing the costs of entrepreneurial risk taking and 
increasing the predictability of legal outcomes.226  Because entrepreneurs 
face many “external risks” that are both unpredictable and beyond the 
entrepreneur’s control,227 the law should serve as a tool to minimize those 
risks that can be controlled.228  For example, although entrepreneurs lack 
the means to singlehandedly control the economy, the law can help 
entrepreneurs minimize the cost of uncontrollable “external” risks like 
market fluctuations by providing them with the means to control how they 
manage their workforce in response to changing economic circumstances. 
 
223 Garicano, Lelarge & Reenen, supra note 194. 
224 Henrekson, supra note 69. 
225 Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 70, at 154. 
226 See Henrekson, supra note 69 (“Individuals carrying out the entrepreneurial function are self-
serving agents, so that we can reasonably assume that entrepreneurs venture into the type of 
entrepreneurship that they expect will lead to the highest private return.”). 
227 Mayer-Schönberger writes that the law ultimately has “two fundamental, reactive roles 
associated with lowering risks for entrepreneurs: directly lowering the cost for entrepreneurial 
activity . . . and increasing predictability.”  Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 70, at 183. 
228 Id. at 175 (“For entrepreneurs, ‘external’ risks are what they can assess, but not control.  Each of 
these risks consists of a cost or benefit and the probability that it will be incurred.”). 
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Consequently, the French legal system should relax rigid hiring and 
firing procedures as well as other constraints on operational flexibility in 
order to provide employers with the freedom to adjust their business 
models as different needs and challenges arise.  Transforming France’s 
heavily regulated labor market, which currently privileges workers over 
employers, into a market that promotes a voluntary exchange of services 
between employers and employees could help accomplish this goal, 
fostering a more favorable environment for entrepreneurial investment.229  
Based on the principle of voluntary exchange, French reform should 
implement measures to improve labor market flexibility by eliminating 
complicated dismissal requirements and empowering workers and 
employers to contract freely.230 
Reforms that introduce greater flexibility in the market should also 
reduce the transaction costs associated with entrepreneurial risk taking.  In 
an article examining the impact of increased legal intervention in the field 
of corporate governance, a group of scholars concluded that legal rigidity 
raised transaction costs and impeded growth.231  The article observed that 
“[s]tricter rules and less flexibility arguably result in higher compliance 
costs and more box-ticking,” which “can have a negative spill-over effect 
on the performance and development of firms.”232  As an alternative, the 
authors proposed a more “flexible principle-based framework,” rather than 
a detailed “one-size-fits-all” approach to regulating corporate governance.233 
 
C.  Transforming Employment Reform into an Entrepreneurial 
Future 
 
After lengthy negotiations between French trade unions and employer 
trade associations, a national agreement was reached to reform French 
labor and employment law on January 11, 2013.234  This agreement, 
referred to as the Accord National Interprofessionnel (or the ANI), was 
signed by three out of five major French trade unions and set forth the 
terms for the French statutory reforms enacted in 2013 as the “Law for the 
Security of Employment,” or Loi 2013-504.235  Although Loi 2013-504 
 
229 Id. at 174–76. 
230 HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 84, at 91 (“[T]he ability of businesses to contract freely for labor 
and dismiss redundant workers when they are no longer needed is a vital mechanism for enhancing 
productivity and sustaining overall economic growth.  The core principle of any market is free, 
voluntary exchange.  That is as true in the labor market as it is in the market for goods.”). 
231 Id. 
232 Jose Miguel Mendoza, Christoph Van der Elst & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation: The Hidden Costs of Corporate Governance in Europe, 7 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 11 (2010). 
233 Id. at 14. 
234 Id. 
235 New Labor and Employment Legislation in France—Is French Labor Law Becoming More 
Flexible?, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP (Apr. 2, 2013) [hereinafter PROSKAUER], http://www.proskauer.com/ 
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implemented a number of changes to provide French employers with more 
flexibility in hiring and firing practices, the reform’s effectiveness at 
reshaping the French economy will be somewhat limited due to the narrow 
scope of the flexibility reforms weighed against other measures to enhance 
employee security. 
 
1.  Reforms Impacting Hiring Practices 
 
The 2013 legislation provides French firms with increased flexibility 
to alter their contractual relationships with employees during periods of 
economic difficulty thanks to measures that facilitate employee mobility 
and temporarily permit employers to cut wages and work hours.236  First, as 
a result of the reform, the Code du travail now permits employers who are 
not engaged in downsizing to negotiate with unions over the geographic 
and occupational mobility of employees within the same company.237  
Additionally, external mobility provisions that apply to firms with a 
minimum of three hundred employees permit employers and employees to 
temporarily suspend their employment relationship while the employee 
searches for a new position in a different company.238  However, the 
arrangements for external mobility may offer less flexibility to the 
employer than the mobility they grant to employees.  Given that the 
employee can independently elect to either return to their prior position or 
leave at a pre-determined date, the advantages of increased employer 
flexibility are somewhat diminished by the unpredictability of the outcome 
at the end of the arrangement.239  Second, under Article L5125-1 of the 
Code du travail, companies that face “serious economic difficulties of a 
cyclical nature,” referred to in French as graves difficultés conjoncturelles, 
can negotiate agreements with the trade unions to modify collective work 
arrangements to reduce employee wages and work hours for a period of up 
to two years in an effort to prevent massive lay offs.240  According to an 
article in the Christian Science Monitor, the critical problem with both of 
these reforms is that they “only increase flexibility during economic 
downturns, and they do nothing to change the employer’s fundamental and 
 
publications/client-alert/new-labor-and-employment-legislation-in-france/. 
236 France Introduces Radical Labour Market Reforms, SQUIRE SANDERS (May 2013) [hereinafter 
SQUIRE SANDERS], http://www.squiresanders.com/files/Publication/5fdc90a3-c1d2-4c6a-b71d-ab4fc74 
29426/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0fbce787-35f0-4c05-becd-b2a7e4620235/France-Introduces 
-Radical-Labour-Market-Reforms-Newsletter.pdf; MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212. 
237 Sarah Dilorenzo, France Approves Major Labor Reform Package, YAHOO NEWS (May 14, 2013). 
238 CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L242-21 (Fr.). 
239 CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1222-12 (Fr.). 
240 CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] arts. L1222-13–L1222-14 (Fr.) (“A son retour dans l’entreprise d’origine, le 
salarié retrouve de plein droit son précédent emploi ou un emploi similaire, assorti d’une qualification et d’une 
rémunération au moins équivalentes ainsi que du maintien à titre personnel de sa classification.”). 
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burdensome obligations to employees.”241 
Moreover, reform measures intended to improve employer flexibility 
must also be weighed against other measures to prevent the creation of 
nonpermanent jobs.242  As a result of the 2013 reform legislation, the 
French statutory regime for part-time employment now requires employers 
to provide part-time employees with a minimum of 24 hours of work per 
week,243 subject to limited exceptions.244  Part-time employees will receive 
increased compensation for any time worked in excess of their contractual 
hours and the law additionally places limits on how many additional hours 
they may work.245  The reforms additionally discourage the use of fixed-
term contracts by increasing employers’ contribution rates to the 
unemployment branch of social security based on the length of the contract 
term: Employer contribution rates, which were previously capped at 4 
percent, have been raised to 4.5 percent for contracts terms shorter than 
three months; 5.5 percent for contract terms that last between one month 
and three months; and 7 percent for contract terms of one month or less.246  
The reform also raises the taxes and fees for hiring workers under 
temporary contracts, which is likely to “hit[ ] businesses hard because 8 out 
of every 10 new hires are on these contracts.”247  Rather than penalizing 
firms for short- and part-term hiring, the Wall Street Journal observes that 
“a more effective tack would be to strip away more of the costly guarantees 
and protections that have made employers so wary of long-term 
contracts.”248 
 
2.  Reforms Impacting Firing Practices  
 
The 2013 reform also introduced substantial changes in dismissal 
procedures for collective redundancies occurring when companies of more 
than fifty employees dismiss over ten employees during a thirty-day 
timeframe.249  In order to provide employers with greater firing flexibility, 
Loi 2013-506 creates two different procedural tracks that simplify the 
 
241 CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L5125-1 (Fr.). 
242 Melchiorre, supra note 139. 
243 See Hollande’s Modest Labor Reform, supra note 214. 
244 CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L3123-14-1 (Fr.).  See also CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. 
L3123-14 (Fr.) (listing all terms to be covered under a part-time employment contract). 
245 Articles L3123-14-2 through L3123-14-5 provide lists of specific exceptions to the law 
mandating part-time employees to work a minimum of twenty-four hours per week.  CODE DU TRAVAIL 
[C. TRAV.] arts. L3123-14-2–L3123-14-5 (Fr.). 
246 French employees are to receive a 10 percent increase on their regular wages for overtime and 
the law prohibits any overtime work in excess of one tenth the duration of an employee’s weekly or 
monthly hours.  CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L3123-17 (Fr.). 
247 MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212. 
248 Melchiorre, supra note 139; Vranceanu, supra note 44. 
249 Hollande’s Modest Labor Reform, supra note 214. 
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implementation of collective dismissals.250  Prior to the 2013 reforms, in 
the case of collective dismissals, employers were typically required to first 
consult with and receive the approval of a “Works Council” regarding the 
content of an employment maintenance plan and then notify and submit the 
plan to the appropriate administrative authorities, all the while adhering to 
a very complex set of procedures and timetables.251 
As part of an “overall aim . . . to speed up the collective consultation 
process,” under the 2013 reforms employers can now either negotiate an 
agreement with one of the relevant trade unions, circumventing 
consultations with the Work’s Council altogether,252 or unilaterally 
implement a maintenance plan, which the Work’s Council must still review 
but can no longer veto.253  Furthermore, regardless of which procedure 
employers adopt, they are relieved from satisfying many other onerous 
dismissal requirements governing meetings with employee representatives, 
the timetable for the collective dismissals, and the selection criteria for 
terminated employees.254  Additionally, under the reform provisions to 
facilitate employee mobility and safeguard employment during periods of 
economic downturn, employees who refuse to agree to these arrangements 
may be terminated.255  Although employers still need to satisfy the typical 
requirements for an economic dismissal, regardless of how many 
terminations occur, the employers are not required to set up a maintenance 
plan.256 
 
3.  Expanding the Scope of the 2013 Employment Reforms 
 
By combining increases in job market flexibility with improved job 
security for employees, the French reforms of 2013 took a moderate 
approach to the “flexicurity” model of reform developed by Denmark, 
Germany, and the Netherlands.257  Granting French companies greater 
flexibility to hire and fire, it also provided roughly 3.5 million lower-wage 
earners with additional employer-financed health benefits and imposed tax 
penalties on French businesses using part-time and temporary employment 
contracts.258 
The greatest problem with the French reform measures, however, is 
that they fell short of implementing the same level of substantive structural 
 
250 SQUIRE SANDERS, supra note 236; PROSKAUER, supra note 235; MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212. 
251 SQUIRE SANDERS, supra note 236; PROSKAUER, supra note 235; MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212. 
252 Employment Protection, supra note 173; SQUIRE SANDERS, supra note 236. 
253 SQUIRE SANDERS, supra note 236; PROSKAUER, supra note 235; MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212. 
254 SQUIRE SANDERS, supra note 236; PROSKAUER, supra note 235; MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212. 
255 SQUIRE SANDERS, supra note 236; see also Employment Protection, supra note 173. 
256 SANDERS, supra note 236; PROSKAUER, supra note 235; MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212. 
257 See, e.g., EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 18–20; LABAYE ET AL., supra note 26, at 33. 
258 Erlanger & Jolly, supra note 219. 
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reform undertaken by other “flexicurity” countries.259  First, the French 
measures geared at injecting more flexibility in the labor market continued 
to reflect an outmoded preference for full-time, open-ended employment 
contracts, which provide increasingly little utility for both employers and 
job seekers in today’s economy.260  France needs to engage in deeper 
structural reforms that relax restrictive hiring practices and stay away from 
the country’s age-old insistence on the CDI to facilitate the use of 
temporary and part-time employment contracts.  Additionally, although the 
millennium has witnessed growing trends across OECD member countries 
in favor of implementing reforms that facilitate the use of fixed-term and 
temporary employment contracts, France and Italy were two of the main 
exceptions to these trends toward the liberalization of employment 
protection legislation.261 
Second, despite measures to facilitate dismissal procedures, the 
French reforms failed to remove one of the most significant obstacles to 
employer flexibility under the Code du travail.  Onerous termination 
procedures still require French companies to justify their financial 
difficulty before they can restructure their workforce and dismiss redundant 
employees.262  The law only permits firms to use the new streamlined 
dismissal procedures to help preserve the competitiveness of companies 
that are already in difficulty, and “firms still cannot lay off workers to 
improve competitiveness when the business is healthy.”263  The 2013 
reforms, therefore, only go half way at providing the greater firing 
flexibility France needs in order to incentivize employers and entrepreneurs 
to resume hiring.264 
Overall, the French reforms placed too great an emphasis on security 
measures in a country that already offers extensive social security benefits, 
as well as other social services that are experiencing increasing pressure in 
light of France’s current rates of job creation.265  Although improved 
security measures, such as enhanced unemployment benefits, job search 
assistance, and professional development training are a critical feature of 
the “flexicurity” model,266 France has a more pressing need to increase job 
market flexibility in order to stimulate job creation and entrepreneurial 
activity during a period of declining competitiveness.  According to a 
 
259 See, e.g., EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 18–20; LABAYE ET AL., supra note 26, at 33. 
260 LABAYE ET AL., supra note 26, at 33. 
261 OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK, supra note 138. 
262 Vranceanu, supra note 44 (describing the legal requirement that an employer provide proof of 
real and serious cause for an economic dismissal as an “absurd requirement” that “interfere[s] with the 
firms’ ‘right-to-manage’”). 
263 Melchiorre, supra note 139. 
264 See id. 
265 LABAYE ET AL., supra note 26, at 11. 
266 Id. at 33. 
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report on French employment prepared by McKinsey Global Institute, 
“France needs to more than double the number of net new jobs it creates 
each year to meet ambitions for employment and prosperity at a par with 
the European average.”267  France should look more to countries like 
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands for a successful example to 
emulate in the future. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The absence of a business environment or legal regime that rewards 
entrepreneurial investment is at the heart of France’s performance gap and 
declining competitiveness.  Along with a detailed discussion of the ways in 
which French employment law impedes entrepreneurial activity and 
unintentionally harms employees in the process, this Note confirms the 
observation that, “[b]y substituting political judgments for those of the 
marketplace, government diverts entrepreneurial resources and energy from 
productive activities to rent-seeking . . . . The result is lower productivity, 
economic stagnation, and declining prosperity.”268  This Note therefore 
concludes that by reforming France’s rigid employment laws through 
deregulation measures that enhance employer flexibility and reduce the 
costs of forming new businesses, the French state can remove barriers to 
entrepreneurial activity and stimulate economic growth. 
As the French economy continues to suffer from high rates of 
unemployment and economic stagnation, there has been increasing 
international unease regarding the vitality of the country’s economic future.  
Before France finds itself on the brink of another recession, now is the 
ideal moment for policymakers to send a positive signal to France’s private 
business sector and the international community by undertaking key 
employment reforms that promote entrepreneurship and create jobs.  In 
particular, French employment law can be improved by increasing the 
hiring and firing flexibility of employers in running their businesses, 
encouraging the voluntary exchange of services between workers and 
employers, and adapting the law to the entrepreneur’s needs by decreasing 
the costs of risk and increasing the predictability of legal outcomes.  By 
reforming employment laws to remove regulations and even create 
incentives for entrepreneurial activity, significant potential exists for a 
country like France to revitalize a depressed economy and generate positive 
growth. 
 
267 Id. at 11. 
268 HERITAGE FOUND, supra note 84, at 88. 
